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The 1959 Tibetan Uprising or 1959 Tibetan Rebellion began on 10 March 1959, when a revolt erupted in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, which had been under the effective control of the Communist Party of China since the Seventeen Point Agreement in 1951.〔Chen Jian, (The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union ), Journal of Cold War Studies, (Volume 8 Issue 3 Summer 2006 ), Cold War Studies at Harvard University.〕 Although the 14th Dalai Lama's flight occurred in 1959, armed conflict between Tibetan rebels and the Chinese army started in 1956 in the Kham and Amdo regions, which had been subjected to socialist reform. The guerrilla warfare later spread to other areas of Tibet and lasted through 1962. The anniversary of the uprising is observed by some Tibetan exiles as the Tibetan Uprising Day. The anniversary of its end is celebrated in Tibet as Serfs Emancipation Day. == Armed resistance in east Tibet == In 1951, a seventeen point agreement between the People's Republic of China and representatives of the Dalai Lama was put into effect. Socialist reforms such as redistribution of land were delayed in Tibet proper. However, eastern Kham and Amdo (western Sichuan and Qinghai provinces in the Chinese administrative hierarchy) were outside the administration of the Tibetan government in Lhasa, and were thus treated more like other Chinese provinces, with land redistribution implemented in full. The Khampas and nomads of Amdo traditionally owned their own land.〔Grunfeld, ''Modern Tibet'', 9.〕 Armed resistance broke out in Amdo and eastern Kham in June 1956. Before the Communist takeover, the relationship between the Khampa and the Dalai Lama's Government had deteriorated badly. As a result, the Khampa barely opposed or even joined the initial Communist assault on Chamdo. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) had occupied Kham without much opposition from the Khampas. The relationship between the Khampa and the Tibetan Dalai Lama government in Lhasa was extremely poor at the time. Pandatsang Rapga, a pro Kuomintang and pro Republic of China revolutionary Khampa leader, offered the governor of Chamdo, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, some Khampa fighters in exchange for the Tibetan government recognizing the independence of Kham. Ngabo refused the offer. After the defeat of the Tibetan Army in Chamdo, Rapga started mediating in negotiations between the People's Liberation Army and the Tibetans. Rapga and Topgay engaged in negotiations with the Chinese during their assault on Chamdo. Khampas either defected to the Chinese PLA forces or did not fight at all. The PLA succeeded in the invasion. By 1957, Kham was in chaos. People's Liberation Army reprisals against Khampa resistance fighters such as the Chushi Gangdruk became increasingly brutal. Reportedly, they included beatings, starving prisoners, and the rape of prisoners' wives in front of them until they confessed. Monks and nuns were forced to have sex with each other and forcibly renounce their celibacy vows. After torture, these men and women were often killed.〔Knaus, ''Orphans of the Cold War'', 134.〕 By the late 1950s Tibetan rebels numbered in the tens of thousands.〔 Kham's monastic networks came to be used by guerilla forces to relay messages and hide rebels.〔Knaus, ''Orphans of the Cold War'', 86.〕 Punitive strikes were carried out by the Chinese government against Tibetan villages and monasteries. Tibetan exiles assert that threats to bomb the Potala Palace and the Dalai Lama were made by Chinese military commanders in an attempt to intimidate the guerrilla forces into submission.〔 Lhasa continued to abide by the seventeen point agreement and sent a delegation to Kham to quell the rebellion. After speaking with the rebel leaders, the delegation instead joined the rebellion. Kham leaders contacted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but the CIA under President Dwight D. Eisenhower insisted it required an official request from Lhasa to support the rebels. Lhasa did not act.〔 Eventually the CIA began to provide covert support for the rebellion without word from Lhasa. By then the rebellion had spread to Lhasa which had filled with refugees from Amdo and Kham.〔 Opposition to the Chinese presence in Tibet grew within the city of Lhasa. In mid-February 1959 the CCP Central Committee’s Administrative Office circulated the Xinhua News Agency internal report on how “the revolts in the Tibetan region have gathered pace and developed into a nearly full-scale rebellion.” in a “situation report” for top CCP leaders.〔(page 69 )〕 When Mao Zedong read it on 18 February, he commented: The next day, the Chinese leader saw a report from the PLA General Staff’s Operations Department describing rebellions by Tibetans in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai. He again stressed that “rebellions like these are extremely favorable for us because they will benefit us in helping to train our troops, train the people, and provide a sufficient reason to crush the rebellion and carry out comprehensive reforms in the future.”〔 The PLA used Chinese Muslim soldiers, who formerly had served under Ma Bufang to crush the Tibetan revolt in Amdo.〔 (note, the link has malfunctioned)〕 In Southern Kham, Hui cavalry were stationed. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「1959 Tibetan uprising」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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